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ing under the principles of due process,
equal protection and effective assistance
of counsel. Id. The prosecution replied
that the purpose of the hearing was to
permit the state to explain its use of the
challenges and that under these circumstances it was not necessary to require an
oath or cross-examination. The trial
judge agreed and quashed the subpoena.
Id.
The trial judge ruled that no prima
facie case of racial discrimination had
been established. Id. In the interest of
prudence, however, the court addressed
the second step of the Batson test (that
the state must proffer a non-discriminatory explanation for the exercise of the
challenge) and found the prosecutor's
explanation would have been sufficient if
a prima facie showing had been made. Id.
Gray again appealed, and this time the
court of special appeals upheld the lower
court, finding that Gray had not shown
that the ruling of the trial court had been
clearly erroneous. Gray petitioned the
court of appeals for certiorari, raising
two issues: 1) whether "[t]he trial court
erred in ruling that the defense failed to
establish a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination in the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges"; and 2)
whether "[t]he trial court erred in refusing to require the prosecutor to testify
under oath and be subject to crossexamination." Id. at 255, 562 A.2d at
1281.
Initially, the Court of Appeals of Maryland assumed that the defendants had
established a prima facie case of racial
discrimination and, therefore, moved
directly to the second issue: whether the
prosecutor should be required to testify
under oath and be subject to crossexamination. /d. at 256, 562 A.2d at
1281. The court noted that in Batson the
Supreme Court refused to specify procedures to be followed when a defendant
objected to a prosecutor's challenges. Id.
at 256-57, 562A.2dat 1281. The majority
of courts that have faced the issue, however, left the procedure to the trial
judge's discretion. The Gray court
deemed this to be the better view, especially in light of the broad variety of
circumstances under which a prosecutor
may be required to offer an explanation
and that the trial judge is to be accorded
broad discretion in conducting a trial. Id.
The court noted, however, one limitation on the discretion of the trial judge:
only a "compelling justification" would
justify an ex parte proceeding sufficient
to meet the dictates of Batson; under
"normal" circumstances an adversary
proceeding should be utilized to
consider Batson challenges. Id. at 25758,562 A.2d at 1282.

The court held the justifications offered by the defense in support of administration of an oath to the prosecutor
were insufficient to remove the decision
from the discretion of the trial judge. All
attorneys are officers of the court, bound
by Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct and "[a] trial judge calling upon the prosecutor to explain his
challenges has every right to expect total
candor without resorting to the administration of an oath." Id. at 258, 562 A.2d
at 1282.
Examining the defendant'S right to
cross-examine the prosecutor, the court
noted "[i]n our adversary system of justice, cross-examination enjoys an exalted
position." Id. at 258-59, 562A.2d at 1282.
The court held that a judge faced with a
request for a cross-examination in a Batson situation has the discretion to grant
the request, but only after a careful
weighing of all the relevant factors in that
particular case. Id. at 259, 562 A.2d at
1282. The court, however, made clear
that the favored procedure under these
circumstances is not a formal adversary
proceeding but rather a relatively informal proceeding similar to that which
occurs during the voir dire examination
of a juror at the bench. Id.
Finally, the court opined that in a posttrial hearing, as opposed to a hearing at
the trial level, factors such as the passage
of time and impairment of memory may
require an explanation under oath and
cross-examination.Id. at261, 562A.2dat
1284. On the facts before the court,
however, the court held that the actions
of the trial court did not amount to an
abuse of discretion. Id.
The decision of the court of appeals in
Gray has left the door open for trial
judges to use the formalities and additional safeguards afforded by a formal
adversarial proceeding when it is faced
with a Batson allegation of discrimination in the selection of a jury. More
importantly, the Gray decision preserves the discretionary power of the
trial judge to determine the proceeding
that is best suited to the circumstances of
the particular case before the court.
-Greg Swain
Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz: PRESS
HAS COMMON lAW RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO AFFIDAVIT
SUPPORTING SEARCH WARRANTS
BETWEEN EXECUTION OF
WARRANTS AND INDICTMENT
In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886
F.2d60 (4th Cir. 1989), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

held that the press's common law right of
access to a sealed affidavit supporting
search warrants during the interval between execution of the warrants and indictment was within the sound discretion of the judicial officer. As a result, in
certain circumstances, the press may
force the government to unseal warrant
papers which could expose continuing
criminal investigations.
On January 27, 1988, a federal magistrate issued three search warrants based
on the affidavit of an FBI agent,.and then
sealed the papers. After execution ofthe
warrants, the magistrate unsealed the
warrants and the returns, but left the affidavit sealed. On May 4, 1988, the Baltimore Sun Company (Sun) petitioned to
unseal the affidavit. However, the magistrate denied the Sun's petition concluding that the public interest in the investigation of crime would not be best served
by allowing the Sun to publish the affidavit. The Sun then sought a writ of mandamus from the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland to compel the magistrate to unseal the affidavit.
The government offered to disclose a redacted version of the affidavit, but the district court declined. Without examining
the affidavit, the district court agreed
with the magistrate's conclusion and
denied the Sun's petition. However,
while the Sun's appeal of the district
court's decision was pending, the magistrate unsealed the affidavit after indictments were returned.
After deciding that the affidavit was a
judicial record, the court noted the superior distinction between the first
amendment and common law rights of
access. Only upon a showing of a
"compelling government interest" and
proofthat the denialis "narrowly tailored
to serve that interest" maya court deny
the first amendment right of access. Id. at
64 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606
(1982». On the other hand, a court may
at its discretion deny the common law
right to access. Id.
The court began its analysis with the
question of whether the Sun had a first
amendment right of access to the affidavit. The court noted that the test for
making such a determination is: "I)
'whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and
general public,' and 2) 'whether public
access plays a significant positive role in
the functioning of the particular process
in question.'" Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1,8-10
(1986». The court held that the Sun's
claim failed the first prong of the test
20.2(fhe Law Forum-25

because the Supreme Court had twice
held that proceedings for the issuance of
search warrants are not open. Id. (citing
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169
(1978); United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972».
Although the Supreme Court addressed
the issue in reference to the public, the
court of appeals stated that "the common
sense reason why proceedings for search
warrants are not open to the public
convinces us that the same principles
apply when the press seeks disclosure."
Id.
After rejecting the Sun's claim of a first
amendment right of access, the court examined the press's common law right of
access. The court held that at common
law the press and the public have a qualified right to judicial records. Id. at 65
(relying on Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99
(1978». "Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (g) facilitates observance of this
right by directing the judicial officer to
file all papers relating to the search warrant in the clerk's office." Id.
The court held that "the common law
qualified right of access to warrant papers is committed to the sound discretion of the judicial officer who issued the
warrant." Id. The court noted that an
abuse of discretion standard applied to
the judicial officer's decision. When
someone seeks to inspect sealed papers,
the judicial officer may deny access if
sealing is "essential to preserve higher
values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest." Id. at 65-66 (quotingPressEnterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.
501,510 (1984». In the instant case, the
magistrate and the district court both
decided that the public interest in the
investigation of crime outweighed the
Sun's interest in publishing the affidavit.
However, the court of appeals noted that
"conclusory assertions are insufficient to
allow review; specificity is required." Id.
at 66. Moreover, the district court failed
to examine the affidavit. Id.
Upon denying access to sealed papers,
the judicial officer must consider alternatives. "This ordinarily involves disclosing
some of the documents or giving access
to a redacted version." Id. In the instant
case, the magistrate complied by unsealing the warrants and the returns. However, the district court erroneously declined the government's offer to disclose
a redacted version of the affidavit. Id.
The court of appeals resolved what was
an ongoing dispute between the press
and the government. By recognizing the
Sun's common law right of access to the
affidavit, the court broadened the free26-The Law Forum/20.2

dom of speech and granted greater privileges to the press. No longer can a judicial officer rely on the government's
position and summarily seal warrant
papers. Rather, the judicial officer must
exercise independent judgment in
reaching such a decision.
-Richard E. Guida
Kosmas v. State: UNSOLICITED
STATEMENT BY WITNESS
INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF
DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO TAKE
LIE DETECTOR TEST
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently reversed a defendant's murder
conviction "because the introductien of
evidence that he refused to take a lie
detector examination prejudiced his case
beyond the point that an instruction to
disregard the testimony reasonably
could be expected to effect a cure."
Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587, 589, 560
A.2d 1137,1138 (1989). In so ruling, the
court of appeals reversed the court of
special appeals. Moreover, this case reflects the continuing trend in Maryland
that evidence of a defendant's refusal to
submit to a lie detector exam is inadmissible and remains inadmissible even if it
is the result of a witness's unsolicited
"blurt out."
Stanley Kosmas suspected his wife
Maria was committing adultery. He hired
a private detective, retired Baltimore City
police sergeant Edward Mattson, to follow her. In early 1985, Mattson discovered Maria and her employer in a hotel
room. Two months later, Kosmas saw his
wife with the same man in her car. In December, 1985, Maria was discovered
murdered within a mile of her home.
The eldest of the Kosmas children testified that his father subjected Maria to
verbal and physical abuse and that Kosmas once threatened to kill her if she left
him.Id. at 590, 560A.2dat 1139. Mattson
testified that Kosmas offered him
$10,000 to murder Maria. Id. Kosmas,
who had an excellent reputation in his
business and home communities, denied
these allegations.
The case turned on Mattson's testimony at trial. He testified that on December 20th, Maria had been missing for four
days. That morning he went to the defendant's home where he found a detective
interviewing Kosmas. While Mattson was
on the stand, the prosecutor asked him if
he heard the content of the conversation
between Kosmas and the detective.
Mattson responded that it was "[iJust the
typical police interview" in' which the
detective asked Kosmas if he had seen his

wife or knew of her whereabouts. Id. at
592, 560 A.2d at 1140. The prosecutor
next asked Mattson, "[a)nd then you
talked to the defendant?" Id. Mattson
replied, "[t)hen I talked to [Kosmas) ....
I said, 'Would you take a lie detector?' He
said no." [d. The defendant's attorneys
immediately requested a mistrial. The
trial judge denied the motion, then instructed the jury to ignore any testimony
concerning a lie detector test. Id. at 59192, 560 A.2d at 1139-40.
The court of appeals first noted that
evidence that the defendant refused to
submit to a lie detector test was inadmissible. Id. at 592-93, 560 A.2d at 1140.
Having established this premise, the
court concentrated on the damage done
to the defendant by the inadmissible evidence and the extent to which the jury
instruction cured this damage. Id. at 594,
560 A.2d at 1141. As a result, the precise
question before the court was "whether
the prejudice to the defendant was so
substantial that he was deprived of a fair
trial." Id. at 595, 560 A.2d at 1141.
The recent decision of Guesfeird v.
State, 300 Md. 653, 480 A.2d 800 (1984),
established factors to help answer this
question. These factors include:
whether the reference to a lie detector was repeated or whether it was a
single, isolated statement; whether
the reference was solicited by counsel, or was an inadvertent and unresponsive statement; whether the witness making the reference is the
principal witness upon whom the
entire prosecution depends; whether credibility is a crucial issue;
whether a great deal of other evidence exists; and whether an inference as to the result of the test can be
drawn.
Kosmas, 316Md.at594, 560A.2dat 1141
(quoting Guesfeird, 300 Md. at 659,480
A.2d at 803).
The state emphasized that the lie detector test was mentioned only once and
that this reference was unsolicited by the
prosecutor. The court, however, responded that the state was not entirely
blameless for this "blurt-out" because
Mattson testified on behalf of the state.
Id. at 595, 560 A.2d at 1141. The court
suspected that Mattson's fifteen years as
a police officer should have made him
aware of the inadmissibility of his statement. The court was also wary of
Mattson's motives for disclosing this evidence since he was once suspected for
the murder. !d. at 595-96, 560 A.2d at
1141-42.
Nonetheless, the court was more con-

